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R. WALLA CE, dba RUSS WAL-
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CASE No. 
10269 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents Security Title Company and 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association sub-
mit the following statement of facts in supplement 
1 
to those set out in Appellants' b1·ief. The Respon-
dent Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion, a corporation, will be referred to in this brief 
as Respondents, 01· Prudential, and Respondent 
Security Title Company will be referred to as Re-
~ondents, 01· Security. The Appellants Pay Less 
Builders Supply, a co1·p01·ation, and Ellis J. Robin-
son and Eliza S. Robinson, his wife, will be referred 
to as Appellants, or Pay Less Builders Supply, and 
Ellis J. Robinson and Eliza S. Robinson respectively. 
The facts of this case a1·e set forth in Respon-
dent's complaint, Appellants' motion to dismiss and 
answer, the answers, counterclaims and cross-claims 
of the other defendants in the action, pre-trial order, 
transcript, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Dec1·ee of Foreclosure, togethe1· with order of 
sale, and the return of sale by the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County. 
On June 25, 1962, Respondent Prudential made 
a loan to Appellants in the sum of $27,500.00 (R.6, 
7 4 Ex. P. 2) To evidence said loan on June 25, 1962 
all Appellants made, executed and delivered to Re-
spondent Prudential a promissory note for the sum 
of $27,500.00, a true copy of which is attached to 
Respondent's complaint. (R. 6, 74 Ex. P. 2) The 
note provides fo1· the payment of interest at the 
rate of 6~~ per annum on the unpaid balance 
until paid, and principal and interest to be paid 
in monthly installments of $232.07 each, commenc-
ing ~n. June 1, 1963. The note contains the following 
prOVlSlOnS: 
'.'If default be made in the payment of 
any mstallment required by this note, or in 
the performa?ce of any .covenant or promise 
of the undersigned con tamed in the trust deed 
s~curing the payment hereof, the entire prin-
cipal sum and accrued interest shall at once 
b_ecome due, payable an~ collectible at the op-
t10n of the holder of this note without notice 
to the undersigned or their successors in in-
tei·est. Failure to exercise this option shall not 
constitute a waiver to exercise the same in the 
event of a subsequent default or defaults. 
This note, or any payment thereimder, 
ni:r !J be e:etended from time to time without in 
an .IJ way affecting or impairing the liability 
of tlir> makers 01· endorsers thereof. 
... in the event Prudential Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association and the Trustee 
uncler deed of trust given to secure the pay-
ment hereof or ei the1· of them shall ( 1) deter-
mine to foreclose said deed of trust by court 
action, 01· ( 2) find it necessary to resort to 
the courts to secure protection of the security 
described in said deed of trust or to enforce 
01· protect the rights of Prudential Federal 
SavinP·s and Loan Association hereunder or 
under"' said deed of trust, or ( 3) be involved 
in com"t action involving or affecting said deed 
of trust, the security given thereunder, or the 
indebtedness secured thereby, the Trustor 
agrees to pay all costs and expens~s incurred 
therein and reasonable compensation for the 
attorneys representing . P1yden ti al Federal 
Savings and Loan Association and the Trus-
tee, or erthe1· of them. 
3 
This note is secured by a real estate deed 
of trust and is given in consideration of a 
loan by the payee hereof to the undersigned." 
(R. 6, 74 P. Ex. 2) 
The original promissory note iv.as identified, offered 
and accepted into evidence by the trial cow·t at pre-
trial iuithout exception by counsel for appellants. 
(R. 6, 74 Ex. P. 2). 
On the same date, June 25, 1962, to secure pay-
ment of the promissory note 'and for the benefit of 
Respondent Prudential as Beneficiary, Appellant 
Pay Less Builders Supply executed and delivered to 
Respondent, Security as Trustee, a deed of trust for 
the sum of $27,500.00, a true copy of which is at-
tached to Respondents' complaint. (R. 7-8, 74 P. Ex. 
1) Said deed of trust was duly acknowledged and 
certified so as to be entitled to record, and was re-
corded on June 27, 1962 in Book 1937, page 174, 
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of 
Utah, and when recorded became a good and suffi-
cient paramount first lien upon the premises situ-
ated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, consisting 
of a house and lot described as follows: 
Lot 15, MT. OLYMPUS COVE, according 
to the plat thereof, recorded in the office of 
the County Recorder of said County. 
The original deed of trust was identified, offered 
and accepted by the trial court at pretrial, again 
withont protest from counsel for Appellants. (R. 74, 
4 
Ex. P. 1), The deed of trust provides among other 
things: 
"A. To protect the security of this Deed of 
Trust, Trustor agrees: 
. l. To k~ep said property in good condi-
tion and repair; ... not to commit or permit 
waste thereon ; . . . 
3. To appear in and defend any action 
or proceeding purporting to affect the secur-
ity hereof or the rights or powers of Benefi-
ciary or Trustee; and to pay all costs and 
expenses, including cost of evidence of title 
and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum, in 
any action or proceeding in which Beneficiary 
or Trustee may appear. 
4. To pay before delinquent all taxes 
and assessments affecting said property; and 
all encumbrances, charges and liens, with in-
terest and penalties, on said property or any 
part thereof, which appear to be or are prior 
or superior hereto. 
In addition to the monthly payments as 
provided in said note, the Trustor agrees to 
pay to the Beneficiary, upon the same day e·ach 
month, budget payments estimated to equal 
one-twelfth of the annual taxes and insurance 
premiums; ... 
7. Should Trustor fail to make any pay-
ment or do any act herein pr?vided, th~n B,~n­
eficiary or Trustee, but without dbhgation 
so to do and without notice to or demand upon 
Trustor and without releasing Trustor from 
any obligation hereof, may: make or do the 
same in such manner and to such extent as 
5 
eitha 'may deern necessary to protect the sec-
urity he1·eof, Beneficiary 01· Trustee being 
authorized to enter upon said property for 
such purposes; appear in and defend any ·ac-
tion or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the right or power of Bene-
ficiary or Trustee; ... and, in e-:rercising any 
such pmvers, 01· in enforcing this Deed of Trust 
by judicial foreclos11re, pay necessary expens-
es, employ counsel and pay his reasonable fees. 
B. It is mutually agreed that: 
5. As additional security, Trustor here-
by gives to and confers upon Beneficiary the 
right, pml'er and anthority, clnring the con-
tinnance of these Tn1sts, to collect the rents, 
issues anc{ prnfits of said propaty, reserving 
unto Tn1stor the right p1·ior to any default by 
Trustor in payment of any indebtedness se-
curecl hereby or in performance of any agree-
ment hereunder, to collect and retain such 
rents, issues and profits as they become due 
and payable . . . 
13. In the event the Beneficiary and the 
Trustee or either of them shall (a) determine 
to foreclose this Deed of Trust by court action, 
or ( b) find it necessary 'to resort to the courts 
to secure protection of the security given here-
unde1· or to enforce or protect the rights here-
under of the Beneficiary, the TnlStor agrees 
to pay all costs and expenses incurred there-
in and reasonable compensations for the at-
torneys representing the Beneficiary and the 
Trustee, or either of them." 
Appellants failed to pay the p1·incipal and inter-
est payments of $232.07 per month which became 
6 
due under said promissory note for the months of 
June through December 1963, and the month of 
January, 1964, when this action was commenced. 
Appellants also failed, refused and neglected to pay 
for each of said months the further amount of $46.93 
per month, the amount required to be paid under said 
deed of trust for taxes, fire and other hazard insur-
ance premiums. (R. 2, 77, 130). In fact, Appellants 
have never made any payments on said promissory 
note or deed of trust for princi'fXll, interest, taxes 
cincl ffre insurance premiums since June, 1963, when 
said payments were to commence. (R. 77, 130). By 
reason of such defaults, Respondents elected to de-
clare the unpaid balance of said note and deed of 
trust clue and payable, and elected to foreclose said 
cleecl of ti·ust in the manner provided by law for the 
foreclosm·e of mm·tgages on real property, as per-
mi ttecl by Sec. 57-1-23, U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
At the time this foreclosure action was com-
menced the Preliminary Title Report, which was 
identified, offered and accepted by the Com~t at Pre-
trial as Respondents Exhibit 3 (R. 74, P. Ex. 3) 
·without exce~)tion by counsel for Appellants showed 
the above presmises, in addition to Respondent's 
deed of trust loan, was encumbered by numerous 
liens, including a Federal tax lien, claimed by de-
fendants amounting to a total sum of $31,548.86. 
Defendants who claimed liens prior to the lien 
7 
of Respondent's deed of trust included the follow-
mg: 
United States of America, Federal 
tax lien (R. 33-34, 79, 74 P. Ex. 3) $5,075.04 
William R. Wallace, dba Russ Wal-
lace Roofing Co., Judgment lien 
(R. 15-16, 81, 7 4, P. Ex. 3) ____________ 1,389.50 
R. W. Frank and Co., Judgment 
Lien (R. 13-14, 82, 74, P. Ex. 3)____ 9,031.73 
MmTay State Bank, Judgment Lien 
(R. 10-11, 74, P. Ex. 3) ________________ 3,087.50 
Utah Sand and G1·avel, Judgment 
Lien (R. 9, 81-82, 74, P. Ex. 3) ________ 658.42 
Breitling Bros. Construction Co., 
mortgage lien, ( R. 18-22, 80, 7 4 
P. Ex. 3) -------------------------------------- 855.00 
Other defendants who claimed liens on the said 
premises without claiming their liens were prior to 
the Respondent's deed of trust are as follows: 
Mt. Olympus Cove, mortgage lien 
(R. 28-32, 79, 74, P. Ex. 3) ____________ $6,000.00 
Mt. Olympus Cove, mortgage lien 
(R. 28-32, 80, 7 4, P. Ex. 3) __________ 2,400.00 
Max G. Frampton and Mary L. 
Frampton, Judgment Lien (R. 74, 
P. Ex. 3) ------------------------------------------ 838.32 
Security Title Company as As-
signee of judgment in favor of Pio-
neer vVholesale Supply Co. (R. 7 4, 
P. Ex. 3) ---------------------------------------- 2,213.35 
TotaL ______________ $31,548.86 
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Appellants in their Sixth Defense of their an-
swer claimed the tax lien of the United States of 
America was prior to Respondent's deed of trust 
lien insofar as it secured payment of Respondents' 
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 27) 
On February 10, 1964, Appellants filed a mo-
tion in the District Court of Salt Lake County to dis-
miss Respondents' complaint because of Respon-
dents' failure to follow statutory remedies provided 
by the Utah Code. This motion was properly noticed 
fo1· hearing by Responclen ts before Third District 
Judge Aldon J. Anderson on February 25, 1964, and 
was denied on the same date. (R. 12, 17, 18). 
On June 29, 1964, Respondents filed their No-
tice of Readiness for Trial. ( R. 73). Third District 
J uclge Stewart M. Hanson set the case for pretrial 
on July 8, 1964. ( R. 73). On July 8, 1964, the pre-
trial hea1·ing was continued by Judge Hanson, upon 
the oral motion of John Elwood Dennett, attorney 
fo1· Appellants, over the objections of Respondents 
and the other defendants' attorneys, in order to give 
Appellants a reasonable time to amend their answer 
and to file a third-party claim and counterclaim: 
"on the proposition that the plaintiff has ille-
gally entered into the premises and purported-
ly sold the same under a conditional sales con-
tract without knowledge and consent of ~he 
defendants, or any of them; that the pla!n-
tiffs collected payments in rents f?r which 
they have failed to ac~ount; and a third-par,ty 
claim and counterclaim on the grounds that 
9 
t~1e prnpel'ty was advantageously sold, ten ta-
tn-ely sold, ancl that the sale failed because 
of malicious interfe1·ence of the plaintiff Pru-~1ential, in t~e proposed ti·ansaction, pi{blish-
~!1g facts wh1~h they were not entitled to pub-
lish, all of which frusti·atecl the sale to the de-
fendants' damage, in excess of the amount 
claimed clue ancl owing, to the defendants' 
damage. 
\Ve woulc1 like to file that counterclaim 
and third party claim, naming those who ma-
liciously in terf e1·ec1, and also make a demand 
fo1· jury trial on the issues.'' (R. 126) 
On September 10, 1964, this case was for the 
sceoncl time set for pl'ef rial hea1·ing before Third 
District Judge Stewart M. Hanson upon the request 
of Respondents' attorney. All parties were present 
at this pretrial hearing, either in pel'Son or by coun-
sel, except defendants Security Title Company, Max 
G. Frampton and Ma1·y L. Frampton, who had fail-
ed to file an answer or otherwise plead to Respon-
dents' complaint and whose defaults had been duly 
entered, (R.70), and Munay State Bank which 
filed a disclaime1· in the action previous to pretrial. 
( R. 71). 
At the Septembe1· 10 p1·et1·ial hea1·ing, discus-
isons we1·e held on all issues and matters raised by 
the pleadings on file in this case. Statements and 
admissions we1·e made by attorneys present on all 
issues before Third District Judge Stewart M. Han-
son ( R. 75-90), including the amounts Respondent 
P1·mlential claimec1 vvere due and owing on its pro-
10 
missory note and deed of t1·ust ( R. 77, 78, 130), and 
all amounts claimed due and owing by Appellants to 
the other defendants in the case on their notes 
' mortgages and judgments. (R. 78-90). The priority 
of lien of Respondent's deed of trust over the claim-
ed liens of other defendants in the case were fully 
examined by Judge Hanson, including the tax lien 
of the United States of America. (R. 76-90, 125). 
In addition, the statutory remedy pursued by Re-
spornlent in foreclosing its deed of trust in the man-
ne1· provided by law for foreclosure on real property 
pennitted by Sec. 57-1-23, U.C.A. 1953, was dis-
cussed and examined by Judge Hanson and counsel 
p1·esent (R. 90, 126-130), as were other matter 
raised by Respondents' complaint and the answer, 
cotmte1·claims and crossclaims of the defendants in 
rhe action, including Appellants. 
Frnm the examination and the admissions and 
stipulations made by attorneys present at pretrial, 
.J uclge Hanson found there were no genuine issues 
as to any material facts between the Appellants and 
Hespondents and the other parties to the case as to 
the balance due and owing to the Respondent Pru-
dential from Appellants for principal, interest and 
costs on Respondent's promissory note, and to the 
amounts due and owing the Respondent Pruden-
tial from the Appellant Pay Less Builders Supply, 
for taxes due Respondent under the deed of trust. 
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At pretrial counsel for Appellants did contend how-
ever that: 
( 1) Respondent's deed of trust was not a 
mortgage and therefore could not be fore-
closed as a real estate mortgage. ( R. 125) 
( 2) The attorney's fees requested by Res-
pondents in the amount of $2,500.00 were un-
reasonable, and that the question should be 
submitted to a jury (R. 126). (It is interest-
ing to note that this was the first time this 
question had been raised in the proceedings 
and the request for jury t1·ial was made or-
ally). 
(3) The cost of Respondent's preliminary 
title report iH the sum of $35.00 ivhich ivas 
of fercd and accepted by the court at preb'ial 
without c~1.:ception from Appellants' co11nsel, 
was 11nreasonable. (R. 74, P. Ex. 3, 131). 
On the grounds that there was no genuine issue 
as to any material fact between Respondents and 
Appellants, and that Respondents were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, the court solicited a 
motion for summary judgment from counsel for 
Respondents, which was made and granted. 
At the pretrial heal'ing on September 10, 1964, 
Appellants renewed their request for leave of the 
court to file the same identical counterclaim and 
thirdbarty claim that they had asked leave of court 
to fife at the first pretrial hearing on July 8, 1964. 
( R. 125, 126). See pagES9, 10, supra. 
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The court denied Appellants' motion, stating: 
"TH_E COURT: Let the record show toot this 
rnotwn 'f!hade ~y defendants through their 
co11nsel is demecl by the Co1irt up on the 
grnnnds and for the reasons that this matter 
ll'as set for July 8, 1.964, at the ho11r of 1 :30 
o'clock P.M. for pretrial hearing and was 
continued at the req11est of John Elwood Den-
nett by th~ Cour.t, O'Ver the objection of the 
other parties, with the understanding that 
the matters now requested by Mr. Dennett 
icoulcl be done within a reasonable time." (R. 
126) 
The court further denied Appellants' motion on 
the ground that Respondents had stipulated that 
Appellants would not be precluded from filing a 
separate action at a subsequent time on such daim 
of Appellants (R. 130), and Respondent Pruden-
tial's attorney would accept service of summons and 
complaint in such lawsuit. 
Counsel fo1· Respondents at pretrial testified 
ancl was cross examined by counsel fo1· Appellants 
on the question of reasonableness of attorney's fees, 
amounts due and owing to Respondents from Ap-
pellants, why a judicial foreclosure was filed and 
othe1· matters. (R. 125-131). 
From the testimony heard, admissions of coun-
sel, and the proofs e~amined and the arguments of 
counsel for the parties at pretrial, the court made 
and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and its Decree of Foreclosure, which were filed on 
October 26, 1964. (R. 75-90). 
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On Octobe1· 27, 1964, notice of entry of Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Lait' and Decree of 
Forecloseure were mailed by Respondents to the 
Appellants. Appellants made no objections or mo-
tions to the co11rt to make additional findings or 
to alter or amend the jlldgment or for a new trial. 
On November 3, 1964, the Clerk of the District 
Court for Salt Lake County issued its 01·der of Sale 
ordering the She1·iff of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, to notice for sale and to sell the premises here-
inabove described and to apply the proceeds of said 
sale as in said judgment and decree directed. ( R. 
101). The Sheriff of Salt Lake County did adver-
tise the premises for sale as required by the laws of 
the State of Utah in foreclosure of i·eal estate mort-
gages and scheduled said property to be sold at Sher-
iff's Sale on Tuesday, December 8, 1964, at the 
time and place advertised. ( R. 111). 
On November 25, 1964, the Appellants filed 
their notice of appeal, the last day it could be filed 
under the Utah Rules. 
Alth011gh it does· not appear in the record, Re-
spondent's attorney on December 7, 1.964, asked Ap-
pellants' attorney if he 1cas going to object to the 
Sheriff's Sale schednled for December 8, 1.964, and 
Appellants' attorney replied that he had no ob~ection 
to the sale and if the sale proceeds were applied ac-
cording to the Decree of Foreclosure, he 1l'01tld dis-
miss the appeal. 
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On Decembe1· 8, 1964, the mortgaged premises 
were sold at Sheriff's Sale to the Respondent Pru-
clential for the total amount of Respondent's judg-
ment, $33,079.15. (R. 120, 121, 122). 
On Februai·y 2, 1965, the Sheriff's Amended 
Return of Sale was filed with the Clerk of the Dis-
tl'ict Court of Salt Lake County. (R. 120-123). The 
return shmvs Respondent Prudential bid the full 
amount of its judgment for the mortgaged premises, 
?,nd Respondents have been paid in full for their 
Judgment, and that Respondents have no claim and 
make no claim of a deficiency judgment against any 
of the Appellants. (R. 120, 121, 122, 123). 
On November 25, 1964, Appellants filed Notice 
of Appeal, appealing the judgment in favor of Re-
spondents and all judgments in favor of the cross-
defencLmts as shown by the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Decree of Foreclosure in their 
entirety. ( R. 100). 
Upon motion of the United States of America, 
which was not opposed by Appellants, this com·t by 
onle1· elated February 1, 1965, dismissed Appel-
lants' appeal from the judgment in favor of United 
States of America. The motion of United States of 
America in paragraph 3 recites, "according to the 
District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree in this case, the Government's tax 
priority and priority to receive distribution from the 
prnceeds of the sale of the property, appears to be 
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propedy founded upon Federal standards, and the re-
fore unquestioned." (R. 115, 116). 
Appellants failed to perfect their appeal from 
the jnclgment in favor of the Respondent in accord-
ance with the Utah A1tles of Civil Procedure. They 
have perfected thefr appeal only after repeated mo-
tions of Respondents and at the direction and order 
of this Court as foll01cs: 
1. Under Rule 75 (a), URCP, Appellants' De-
signation of Record was to be filed on December 7, 
1964 ( 10 days after Notice of Appeal was filed on 
November 25, 1964). This Court, by order dated 
February 1, 1965, made upon motion of Respon-
dents, ordered Appellants to file Designation of Rec-
ord on or before February 3, 1965. Appellants filed 
Designations of Record on February 4, 1965 ( 59 
days late). (R. 119) 
2. Under Rule 75 ( d), URCP, Appellants' 
Statement of Points was to be filed on December 7, 
1964 (10 days after Notice of Appeal was filed 
November 25, 1964). This Court by order dated 
February 1, 1965, made upon mdtion of Respon-
dents ordered Appellants to file their Statement of 
' ' Points on or before February 3, 1965. Appellants 
Statements of Points was filed on February 4, 1965 
(59 days late). (R. 118) 
3. Under Rule 75(a) (1), URCP, on Decem-
ber 10, 1964, 15 days after Notice of Appeal was 
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filed November 25, 1964, Appellants were required 
to file their Certificate stating, H(a) that a tran-
script of evidence has been ordered from the court 
reporter, or (b) that he does not intend to rely upon 
said transcript." This Certifioote has never been 
filed. On or about March 19, 1965, Appellants order-
ed the transcript from the court reporter at the in-
sistence of this Court (approximately 99 days late). 
4. Under Rule 73 (g), URCP, the Record on 
Appeal was to be filed on or before January 4, 1965 
( 40 days after Appellants filed Notice of Appeal 
November 25, 1964). This Court, upon motion of 
Respondent by order dated March 15, 1965, ordered 
the i·ecord to be filed on or before March 20, 1965. 
Record was actually field on March 2'2, 1965 (76 
clays late). 
5. Under Rule 75 (p), URCP, Appellants' 
brief was due to be filed with the Clerk of this Court 
on February 4, 1965 (one month after the Record on 
Appeal was due to be filed). Once again this Court, 
upon motion of Respondents, 'by order dated March 
15, 1965, ordered Appellants to file their brief with-
in 15 days of order (to-wit March 20, 1965). On 
April 5 1965 this Court further ordered the Appel-
' ' lants to file their brief by 5 o'clock P.M. on April 
5, 1965. Appellants filed a typewritten brief on 
Aprll 6, 1965 ( 61 days late). 
6. On April 29, 1965, Appellants filed their 
first printed brief (84 days late). Respondents were 
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not served with copies of said brief. On May 4, 1965, 
counsel for Respondents notified the Clerk of this 
Court that he was not served with two copies of Ap-
pellants' brief as required by Rules 75 (p) ( 1). On 
May 10, 1965, Respondents received two copies of 
Appellants' printed brief (95 days late). 
Appellants in the last sentence of their State-
ment of Facts note that there is a party in posses-
sion of the premises, consisting of a house and lot. 
This is ti·ue. Appellants abandoned the p1·esmises and 
permitted waste to be committed upon the premises 
and the premises to deteriorate, in violation of their 
deed of trust contract with Respondent. (R. 74, P. 
Ex. 1). Appellants permitted windows to be broken 
in the house, moisture to enter the house, floors to 
warp and buckle, and a crack to develop in a wall of 
the house. To prevent fmther deterioration and pro-
tect its ecurity, Respondents without any objection 
from Appellants took possession and placed a tenant 
in possession of the premises as authorized by its 
deed of trust. (R. 7 4, P. Ex. 1, 129, 130). The rent-
al agreement with said tenant provides for payment 
of rent, and gives to the tenant an option to purchase 
the p1·emises for the sum of $34,000 (which sum in-
cludes a real estate commission), upon the condition 
that the premises are not redeemed by Appellants or 
their creditors during the statutory period of re-
demption which expired on June 8, 1965. (R. 120-
123). In case of Redemption, Redemptioner is to 




WHERE A PRETRIAL CONFERENCE RESULTS 
IN A DETERMINATION THAT THERE ARE NO DIS-
PUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT, AND ALL QUESTIONS 
OF LAW ARE DISPOSED OF BY THE PRETRIAL 
COURT, THE COURT HAS THE INHE'RENT AUTHOR-
ITL, ON MOTION, TO ENTER ITS FINAL JUDGMENT. 
Since all questions of fact were resolved at the 
pretrial conference, and only three questions of law 
were posed, to-wit: ( 1) Appellants' right to jury 
trial on the question of reasonableness of Respon-
dents' title report costs and attorney's fees, (2) Re-
spondents' right to foreclose a deed of trust as 
a real estate mortgage, and ( 3) Appellants' 
right to file a third-party claim and counterclaim, 
and these were ruled upon by the trial court adverse 
to the Appellants, the case was ripe for the entry of 
a summary judgment, or a judgment on the plead-
mgs. 
Motion for such an order can properly be made 
orally, since Rule 7 ( b) ( 1) URCP requires all such 
applications to the court to be on written motion, 
"unless made cl11ring hearing or trial." Moreover, 
pursuant to Rule 12 ( c), after the pleadings are 
closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, 
any pa1'ty may move for judgment on the pleadings. 
If matters outside of the pleadings are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56. Hence, regardless of what 
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the motion is called which was made by counsel for 
the Respondent Prudential upon conclusion of the 
pretrial conference, it is apparent that nothing would 
be gained by requiring that a party be forced to wait 
ten days after a pretrial conference, at which all is-
sues of law and fact had been resolved, before he 
could properly bring a motion for summary judg-
ment before the court by giving ten days notice, 
whereas if the motion is considered a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings it could be made orally 
at pretrial and judgment could thereupon be entered. 
The trial court acted p1·operly in exercising its 
i·ight to rule upon the remaining questions of law 
and enter its judgment accordingly. Merely because 
a motion fo1· entry of judgment on the pleadings 
appears to take the form of a motion for summary 
judgment, it does not necessarily follow that the 
motion for judgment on the pleadings is a motion 
for summa1·y judgment requiring compliance by the 
moving party with the notice provisions of Rule 
56(c), URCP. 
The gene1·al rule concerning the court's pre-
rogative under such ci1·cumstances to summarily dis-
pose of a case is summarized in 22 A.L.R.2d 599 at 
609 as follows: 
"\Vhere a pretrial conf e1·ence re~ults in a de-
termination that there are no disputed ques-
tions of fact the case is i·ipe for the entry of 
a summary judgment in accord with the un-
disputed facts. (Citing auth01:ity) . : . In-
herent in the pretrial prncess is the nght of 
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the court to dispose of questions of law and 
w:1er~ there are no issues of fact, so that only 
questions of law remain to be solved and these 
are disposed of at a preti·ial confer~nce judg-
ment must necessarily follow for one p~rty or 
the other." 
This general rule has been aG_cepted in the fol-
lowing cases: 
In Shield v. Welch, 73 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1950), 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where 
the trial court concluded a pretrial conference that 
action for a broker's commission resolved itself into 
a question of law, the trial court, upon resolving 
the question of law in favor of the defendant, pro-
perly entered a s11mmary jiulgment in .favor of the 
defendant, even in the absence of any notice by de-
fendant of a motion therefor. 
In the case of Hinkle v. Hargens, 81 N.W.2d 
888 at 889, (S.D. 1957) the Supreme Court of South 
Dakota held "that if all disputed questions of fact 
are eliminated at the pretrial conference, the court 
has the inhe1·ent authority, on motion, to enter final 
judgment." 
In Kindley v. Williams, 76 N.W.2d 227 at 231, 
the Supreme Court of South Dakota a:lso held that 
"if a claim of a party is to be dismissed as a result 
of a pretrial, the orderly procedure is by motion, 
which if the facts justify, may be based upon the 
pretrial record .... Where at pretrial admissions 
and pleadings show that no issue of fact remains to 
be determined, court has power to decide questions 
. d t" of law and enter summary JU gmen . 
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See also 88 C.J.S., Trials, Sec. 17(2), p. 45 
which states: "If the pretrial confe1·ence progresse~ 
to the point of eliminating all questions of fact, the 
court may give judgment according to the law on 
the facts before him." 
To rule otherwise would require the trial court 
to ignore the stated rationale of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which require that they "shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and in-
expensive determination of every action." (Rule 
1 (a), URCP). 
POINT II 
A COURT AT PRETRIAL MAY GO OUTSIDE OF 
THE PLEADINGS TO DETERMINE IF ANY GENU· 
!NE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IS PRE-
SENT IN DETER:\fINING IF A PARTY MOVING FOR 
A SU:}D'IARY JUDGMENT IS ENTITLED TO JUDG-
MENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Appellants contend at pages 4 and 5 of their 
brief that the judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed because the provisions of Rule 56 ( c) 
URCP, and the interpretations of Rule 56(c) by 
this Court prohibit the trial coul't from going out-
side the pleadings to determine if there is any genu-
ine issue as to any material fact between the parties, 
and to determine if Respondents are entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Appellants' contentions are 
incorrect since: 
( 1) The third sentence of Rule 56 ( c) express-
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ly authorizes the trial court to consider matters 
other than pleadings in determining whether any 
genuine issue as to any material fact exists between 
the parties. 
( 2) This Court has held that a trial court 
under Rule 56 ( c) is authorized to go beyond the 
pleadings in determining that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact, and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
See Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunning-
ham, 10 U.2d 329, 353 P.2d 168, 170, where this 
Com~t held Rule 56 ( c) permits excursions beyond 
the pleadings, and if facts discovered irrefutably 
disprove facts pleaded, summary judgment is ap-
pl'Opriate on motion therefor. For other Utah cases 
see Frederick May (_(: Co. v. Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 368 
P.2d 266; Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 14 
U.2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010, and Dupler v. Yates, 10 
U.2d 251, 351P.2d624. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT RE'SPON-
DB~NTS HA VE FAILED TO PROVE BY COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR CAUSE OF 
ACTION IS A 1.\'IERE EMPTY PLEA SINCE NO AUTH-
ORITY AND NOTHING SPECIFIC IS CITED IN SUP-
PORT THEREOF. 
Appellants claim Respondent's note and mort-
gage were not identified, offered and admitted in 
evidence by the trial court. This is not true. Respond-
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ent's loan documents consisting of prnmissory note, 
deed of trust and title report were identified, offer-
ed and admitted in evidence as exhibits by the trial 
court without objection by Appellants' counsel. 
These exhibits were in the District Court Clerk's 
office at the time the record was prepared, but for 
some reason were inadvertently omitted. They h:ave 
since been insterted in the record at the request 
of Respondent's attorney. (R. 74, P. Ex. 1, 2, & 3). 
Appellants further claim there is not one word 
about offering or tendering these exhibits into evi-
dence. This is not true. The exhibits show they 
were offered and accepted, and the transcript 
shows testimony i·egarding the priority of liens 
of the parties to the foreclosure action as shown by 
title report. ( R. 125). In addition, the transcript 
shows testimony that Appellants had made no pay-
ments on Appellants' loan with Respondent Pru-
dential. (R. 125, 130). Furthe1·, the transcript 
shows testimony on the issue of attorney's fees and 
cost of title report. (R. 127-131). 
In addition to the documentary evidence, Re-
spondent's judgment is based upon testimony ap-
pearing in the transcript, admissions and state-
ments of counsel submitted at pretrial, and not con-
tained in the transcript. Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law were made by the court upon this 
evidence. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were served upon Appellants' counsel and no 
objections were made to them by Appellants' coun-
sel, or motion filed to alter or amend the same under 
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Rule 52, nor did Appellants' counsel file a motion 
for a new· trial under Rule 59. 
Furthermore, when a court of competent juris-
diction has entered a judgment in relation to any 
subject within its jurisdiction, the presumption 
arises that it had before it sufficient evidence to 
authorize it to render such judgment, and that all 
facts required to he proved to confer jurisdiction 
were duly proved though the record is silent upon 
the matter. Moreover, upon colla:teral attack every 
presumption is in favor of validity of judgments of 
courts of general jm·isdiction and every fact not 
negatived by the record is presumed in support of 
the judgment. lVarren 'l.J. Stansbury, 126 P.2d 251 
a:t 253 (Okla. 1942) ; In Re Couch's Estate, 126 P.2d 
994 (Okla. 1942). See also Thompson v. Short, 106 
P.2d 720 at 726 (Wash. 1940), where the Supreme 
Court of Washington held, affirming earlier author-
ity, "Every fact not negatived by the record will be 
presumed in aid of the judgment, and it will only be 
held void when it affirmatively appears from the 
record 'that the court had no jurisdiction to render 
it." See also Stafford v. Dickison, 374 P.2d 665 at 
671 (Hawaii 1962), and 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, 
Sec. 28 et seq. 
The rule was perhaps most clearly stated by the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Welch v. 
Focht, 171 P. 730 at 732 (Okla. 1918), as follows: 
"There is also practical unanimity among the 
authorities that a judgment of a court of gen-
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e1·al jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attack-
ed, _unl_es~ t~e recm·d affirmatively shows want 
of Junsd1ct10n, and every fact not negatived 
?Y the record is presumed in support of the 
Judgment of a com·t of general jurisdiction, 
and where the record of the com·t is silent 
upon the subject, i~ must be presumed in sup-
port of the proceedmg~ that the court inquired 
mto and found the existence of facts author-
izing it to render the judgment which it did." 
(Ci ting extensive au thol'ity) 
It must also be noted that the1·e is a presump-
tion that the judgment of the t1·ial court was correct 
and every i·easonable intendment must be indulged 
in favor of it; the bm·den of affirmatively showing 
e1To1· is on the party complaining thereof. Palfrey· 
man v. Bates c~· Rogers Construction Co., et al., 108 
Utah 142, 158 P.2d 132 at 1:33; TV heat v. Denver & 
R. G. TV. R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932 at 935; 
Burton v. Zions Coopaative Mernantile Institution, 
122 Utah 360 249 P.2d 514 at 518. 
It is therefore abundantly cleai· that the burden 
is upon the Appellants to prove that Respondent 
Prudential failed to prove the material allegations 
of its complaint and this burden cannot be fulfilled 
merely by a flat unsuppo1·ted allegation in their 
brief. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NOTHING IN SECTION 57-1-23, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS AMENDED, WHICH 
WOULD REQUIRE THE BENEFICIARY WHO ELECT· 
ED TO FORECLOSE A TRUST DEED IN THE MANNER 
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PROVIDED BY LAW FOR THE FORECLOSURE OF A 
MORTGAGE ON REAL PROPERTY, TO NOTIFY THE 
CREDITOR OF SUCH ELECTION. 
Appellants contend in their brief at page 6 that, 
''There is no record to indicate how and when that 
option was exercised prior to filing the complaint, 
and if so, how the notice of that option was made 
know (sic) to the Appellants," although Appellants 
concede that such an option exists. There is nothing 
in Section 57-1-23 which grants this choice to the 
beneficiary, which requires notice of any kind prior 
to the commencement of the action. Moreover, under 
the Utah law governing the foreclosure of mortgages 
(Sections 78-37-1 et seq, UCA 1953 as amended), 
there is also no requirement of an advance notice to 
a defaulting debtor of an intention to foreclose the 
mo1'tgage. Commencement of the foreclosure action, 
a proper service of process, and a copy of the com-
plaint we1·e the only notice to which the Appellants 
were en ti tlecl. 
In addition, notice in the instant case is com-
pletely irrelevant and Appellants' contention of lack 
of notice is raised for the first time on appeal. It 
is obvious that Appellants are grasping for straws 
and that very little is required of Respondents in 
order to answer such a contention. It may, however, 
be of interest to the Court to note that the power of 
sale and the right to foreclose have been held to be 
concurrent remedies in other jurisdictions; the cred-
itor may proceed with either or both at the same 
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time (Carpenter v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 71 Cal. 
App.2d 593, 163 P.2d 73 (Dist. Gt. App.), cert. 
denied, 328 U.S. 84 7 ( 1945), and the institution of 
one remedy does not preclude the enforcemenit of the 
other. Carpenter v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., supra; 
Carpenter v. Hamilton, 59 Cal. App.2d 146, 138 
P.2d 353 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943); llicDonald v. Smoke 
Creek Live Stock Co., 209 Cal. 231, 286 Pac. 693 
( 1930). The U ta:h statute does not prohibit this 
procedure. Early Utah cases held that adding the 
power of sale did not in any way restrict the fore· 
closure right. Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Soidh 
'Ogden Land, Bldg. & Improvement Co., 20 Utah 267, 
58 Pac. 843 (1899); Dupee v. Rose, 10 Utah 305, 
37 Pac. 567 ( 1894). For a thorough discussion of 
the Utah Trust Deeds Act, see Note, 8 Utah Law Re. 
view at 125 et seq. 
POINT V 
THE TRlAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING 
COSTS, EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, SINCE 
SUCH FEES ARE 'BOTH A'LLOWED UNDER UTAH 
LA'W AND ARE JUST IN THE PREMISES. 
Appellants in their brief at page 7 contend that 
Respondent Prudential was limited in the recovery 
of its fees to the provisions of Section '57-1-31, 
U.C.A. 1953 as amended. However, a careful read· 
ing of this section indicates that the designated li~i­
tation on the payment of attorney's fees is apphc-
able only in the limited instance where a default· 
ing debtor corrects his default prior to the comple· 
tion of a sale, by power of sale, under a valid trust 
28 
deed. This Section is obviously not applicable in the 
instant case since Appellants nei1ther attempted to 
correct the default nor was such recourse available 
to them under the circumstances where the benefi-
ciary elected to foreclose the trust deed as a mort-
gage. The award of attorney's fees for the presecu-
tion of a mortgage foreclosure in Utah is controlled 
by Section 78-37-9, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, and 
the trial court's action in the instant case was well 
in line with statutory authorilty. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AL-
LOW THE .NPPELLANTS A JURY TRIAL. 
Appellants' contention that their right to a jury 
trial was improperly denied is ludicrous under the 
facts of this case. A demand for jury trial in Uta:h 
is governed by the provisions of Rule 38, URCP, 
and in the complete a:bsence of any attempt by Ap-
pellants to make a written demand for a jury trial, 
and to pay the statutory jury fee, they are barred 
from raising this contention for the first time on 
a:ppeal. See Hamilton et al. v. Salt Lake County 
Sewerage Improvement District No. 1, et al., 15 
U.2d 216, 390 P.2d '235; In Re Woodward, 14 U.2d 
336, 384 P.2d 110; Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 
13 U.2d 397, 375 P.2d 456; Carson v. Dougl,as, 12 
U.2d 4'24, 367 P.2d 462; North Salt Lake v. St. Jo-
seph Water & Irr. Co., et al., 1'18 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 
577; 5 Am. J ur.2d, Appeal and Error, Sec. 545 et 
seq, pp. 29 et seq. 
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Moreover, the only mention made by Appel-
lants of a jury trial, raised during the pretrial con-
ference, was an oral request by counsel for Appel-
lants that the question of attorney's fees be submit-
ted to a jury. Quite obviously, the question of entitle-
ment to attorney's fees is not a question triable by 
a jury, but is a clear and simple question of law 
to be decided by the com't. This is made abundantly 
clear in Sec. 78-37-9, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, which 
provides in part as follows: 
"In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's 
fee is claimed by the plain tiff, the amount 
thereof shall be fixed by the court, any stipu-
lation to the contrary notwithstanding; . . . 
See also 37 Am. J m'., JJ nrtgages, Secs. 600, 601, 
pp. 81, 82. 
POINT VII 
A TRUSTEE IN AN ACTION TO FORECLOSE A 
DEED OF TRUST AS A l\IORTGAGE IS A PROPER 
PARTY PLAINTIFF. 
Section 57-1-23, U.C.A. 1953 as amended gives 
a beneficiary under a deed of trust the option in 
case of default to either hold a Trustee's sale under 
a powe1· of sale, or to foreclose the trust deed under 
the law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real 
property. The statute does not state whether the 
trustee or beneficiary named in the trust deed shall 
bring the action to foreclose and Respondents admit 
it is arguable that either or both should have the 
power. The Utah Supreme Court in prior decisions 
has allowed the beneficiary to bring a foreclosure 
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action on the ground that the trustee could not 
assert any right, interest or defense which the bene-
ficiary, the real party in interest, could not make. 
See Weir v. Bauer, 75 Utah 498, 286 Pac. 936 
( 1980), Sidney Stevens Implement Co., v. South Og-
den Land, Bldg. & Improvement Co., supra, Dupee 
v. Rose, supra. Even though these cases hold the 
beneficiary shall bring the action to foreclose, they 
do not hold the trustee is not a proper party. 
There are decisions from other states that hold 
that where the beneficiary could not practicably 
bring the action, as where the beneficiaries are too 
numerous, the trustees should be allowed to bring the 
foreclosm·e action. See e.g. Barkhausen v. Contin-
ental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 351 Ill. App. 388, 
115 N.E.2d 640 (1953), White v. MacQueen, 360 Ill. 
286, 243, 195 N.E. 832, 835 (1935). 
The California Trust Deed Law which served as 
a pattern for the Utah Deed of Trust Law specific-
ally allows either the beneficiary or the trustee to 
bring the foreclosure action. (Calif. Code Civ. Proc., 
Sec. 725 (a), 34 Cal. J ur. 2d 171 et seq.) 
From the foregoing authorities, Respondents 
contend that the trustee is not a necessary ]Xlrty 
plaintiff to bring the foreclosure action; however, 
the trustee is a p1'oper party pl.aintiff, and in no 
event should a judgment of foreclosure be reversed 
because the trustee and benficiary file the action 
as co-plaintiffs. 
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Security Title Company was named defendant 
in Respondent's complaint because it was the as-
signee of judgment against the Appellants in favor 
of Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co. ( R. 7 4 P. Ex. 3) 
Said judgment constituted a lien against the mort-
gaged premises, which had to be cleared from the 
title to the premises through foreclosure. Said judg-
ment has been satisfied since the commencement of 
the foreclosure adion and simultaneously with the 
filing of this brief, Security Title Company has filed 
with this Court a disclaimer, whereby it disclaimed 
any interest in and to the property which is the sub-
ject matter of this foreclosure action. The conten-
tion of Appellants that Security Title Company ap-
pears both as plaintiff and ,as a defendant is there-
fore moot. 
POINT VIII 
APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT ELLIS J. ROBINSON 
AND ELIZA ANN ROBINSON AFFIXED THEIR SIG· 
NATURES TO THE PROMISSORY NOTE AS ACCOM· 
MODATION MAKERS WAS NOT RAISED IN THE 
PLEADINGS OR AT PRETRIAL AND CANNOT BE 
RAISED FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
The promissory note shows the personal en· 
dorsements of Ellis J. Robinson and Eliza Ann Rob· 
inson as co-makers (R. 74, P. Ex. 2), which fact 
Appellants admit in the Seventh Defense in their 
Answer. (R. 26, 27). No claim was made by Appel-
lants in their pleadings or at the pretrial confer· 
ence that Ellis J. Robinson and Eliza Ann Robinson 
executed the promissory note as accommodation 
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makel'S. Their claim cannot be brought before this 
Court for the first time on appeal. (See cases cited 
under Point VI supra.) 
As further argument against Appellants' claim 
on this point, an examination of the Sheriff's Re-
turn of Sale shows Respondent Prudential has been 
paid in full for its judgment of foreclosure and that 
Respondent Prudential has no deficiency judgment 
against any of the Appellants. Moreover, Respon-
dents now make no claim of deficiency judgment 
against them. Therefore, the claim of Appellants 
that Ellis J. Robinson and Eliza Ann Robinson have 
been released from liability from Respondents' judg-
ment because of the claimed waivers becomes a 
moot question. 
POINT IX 
THE 1BURDEN OF PROVING ERROR MAY NOT 
BE SHIFTED ON APPEAL FROM APPELLANT TO 
RESPONDENT AND REVIEWING COURT CANNOT 
BE EXPECTED TO PROSECUTE INDEPENDENT IN-
QUIRY TO FIND REASONS FOR OR AGAINST RUL-
INGS OF TRIAL COURT, BUT IT IS DUTY OF COUN-
SEL FOR APPELLANT, BY CITATION OF AUTHORI-
TIE'S AND BY ARGUMENT, TO SHOW COURT IN 
WHAT MANNER RULINGS COMPLAINED OF ARE 
ERRONEOUS. 
This court speaking through then District 
Judge Crockett stated in the case of Palfreyman v. 
Bates & Rogel's Construction Co., et al, 108 Utah 
142, 158 P.2c1132 at 133: 
"We are favored with no citation of author-
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ity in the .appellant's brief. This com·t does 
not look with favor upon the cause of a liti. 
gant who raises points and casts them in the 
lap of the court for i·esea1·ch and determina-
tion, and if this is done, it is within the dis. 
cretion of the court to ref use to consider 
them." (Citing authorities) 
See also Arnold v. Splendid Bakery, 401 P.2d 271 
at 277 (Idaho 1965) ; H' illiams v. DeLay, 95 P.2d 
839 (Alaska 1964); Weaver v. Sibbett, 393 P.2d 
601 (Idaho 1964); Reed v. State Election Board, 
369 P.2d 156 (Okla. 1962); and McDaniel v. Mc-
Daniel, 391 P.2d 191 (Wash. 1964). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respecfully submitted that Appellants' ap· 
peal should be dismissed and the judgment of the 
trial court affirmed on the ground that: 
( 1) The only genuine issue between the Ap· 
pellants and Respondents is attorney's fees claimed 
by Respondents in their complaint and allowed by 
the trial court in the sum of $2,500. Respondent 
Prudential has consumated a sale of the mortgaged 
premises for $34,000 upon the condition that the 
Respondent's judgment and the Sheriff's sale are 
affirmed by this Court. If the attorney's fees al· 
lowed to the Respondent a1·e cancelled by this Court, 
Respondent's judgment will be reduced to the sum 
of $30,579.15, and Appellants will i·ealize the net 
difference between Respondent's judgment and the 
option sales price, or the sum of $3,430.85, (less a 
real estate commission); despite the fact that Ap-
pellants have paid nothing on Respondent Pruden-
tial's loan. 
( 2) The law applicable to each point raised 
by the Appellants is against Appellants and in favor 
of the Respondents; 
( 3) A review of the record in this case shows 
that counsel for Appellants has done everything 
within his power to obstruct the orderly prosecution 
of this foreclosure action in the trial court and this 
Court by the filing of dilatory motions and by his 
failure to abide by the rules fixed by this Court 
gove1·ning appellate procedure, which all members 
of the Bar a1·e bound to uphold; and 
( 4) Appellants fail to cite one text or one 
case authority in support of their contentions, as set 
forth in their brief, to assist this Court in its deter-
mination of this Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL P. STATEN 
DON A. STRINGHAM 
604 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
315 East 2nd South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
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